The Working Paper Series (WPS) is produced by the Development Research Department of the African Development Bank. The WPS disseminates the findings of work in progress, preliminary research results, and development experience and lessons, to encourage the exchange of ideas and innovative thinking among researchers, development practitioners, policy makers, and donors. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in the Bank's WPS are entirely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the view of the African Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent. Introduction Africa, as other developing regions, has experienced a surge in private capital inflows since the early 2000s (Dorsey et al., 2008; AfDB et al., 2013) . Since large capital inflows and their sudden reversals can lead to inflation and major growth and exchange rate volatility and even crisis, they require appropriate policies. Capital controls are one of the measures, but come with substantial cost (Edwards, 1999; Brixiová et. al., 2010; Ncube et al., 2012; IMF, 2013a) .
How prepared are the African policymakers for making the most out of capital inflows while mitigating their cost? Until recently, managing volatile capital flows has not created a major policy challenge in Africa, not even during the global financial crisis (Kasekende et al., 2010) . This is because the relatively stable Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows account for most of capital inflows to the continent. However, given the trend towards Africa's deeper integration into the global financial markets, its frontier market countries are likely to become increasingly vulnerable to global financial shocks (IMF 2013a) . Effective management of the financial integration and these volatile capital flows is becoming an important policy priority. This paper models the impact of uncertain growth outcomes on capital account policies in the adaptive learning framework. In this framework, policymakers choose capital account policies (liberalization or controls) to maximize growth, taking into account the net growth payoffs. Their choices are constrained by the 'Mundell's trilemma' -the ability to reach only two goals among financial liberalization, fixed exchange rate and monetary autonomy. We simulate our model with parameters reflecting policymakers' initial beliefs about the impact of capital account policies on growth, which are updated each period for outcomes.
The paper thus explores the ability of an adaptive learning framework to help explain the paths of capital account liberalization in Africa and other developing regions. The impact of capital account policies on growth has long been the subject of policy controversy. Policymakers in different countries, regions and institutions have had different views on the growth impact of capital account liberalization, and especially the trade-offs between growth level and volatility. These views change over time based on actual experiences:
'…The IMF once advocated the removal of all controls on outflows and inflows in the heydays of the Washington Consensus in the 1990s. The Asian Crisis of 1997-1998, however, initiated a slow process of conversion that culminated with the IMF's recent decision to explicitly and openly support the imposition of controls on capital inflows.... The basic premise of this new IMF stance on capital controls is that controls should be imposed when countries are facing a capital inflow surge and after all other policy alternatives have been exhausted.' (Jinjarak et al., 2012) '…There is relatively little empirical evidence on the effectiveness or otherwise of the cyclical types of capital controls that several EMEs (emerging market economies) have introduced since 2009 in the aftermath of the global financial crisis…' (Ahmed, S. and Zlate, A.; 2013) Over time, policymakers' views on capital account policies have evolved from favoring liberalization under the Washington consensus to recognizing usefulness of capital flow restrictions in specific circumstances. The global financial crisis reinforced the message that full capital account liberalization may not be the right goal for all countries at all times. In fact, IMF (2013b) acknowledges usefulness of capital account controls during a financial crisis or when the crisis is imminent. Studies show that depending on the shocks received, either capital controls or liberalization can be optimal (Farhi and Werning, 2013) .
In Africa, the trend has been towards gradual capital account liberalization, but regulations of capital flows are complex, with many restrictions. As in other developing regions, the capital account liberalization in Africa raises uncertainty about growth and other outcomes for at least three reasons: (i) capital controls alter the overall economic environment, the impact of which on incentives and outcomes will be known only with time; (ii) capital flows raise exposure of the domestic economy to external shocks; and (iii) due to their pro-cyclicality, capital flows exacerbate negative shocks that the domestic economy may be dealing with.
This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of growth on capital account policies under uncertainty, utilizing adaptive learning along the lines of Buera et al. (2011) and Bicaba and Coricelli (2014) . 2 The adaptive learning approach is applied to capital account policies in Africa and other developing regions. The framework is particularly suitable to African economies that receive severe and frequent shocks (e.g. conflicts, political crises, weather) which are difficult to predict. These economies also exhibit structural weaknesses, making expectations highly unstable.
The importance of adaptive learning for capital account management has been supported by several authors, including Prasad and Rajan (2008) . This approach maintains flexibility that allows changes in policies with varying circumstances. Prasad and Rajan (2008) posit that countries following such a pragmatic approach will liberalize their capital account when the risks of doing so are low, allowing their institutions to develop during a relatively "benign" period. The adaptive learning is also related to the long-standing debate on rules vs. discretion in policymaking (Kydland and Prescott, 1977) . Since the adaptive learning approach leaves room for discretion, policymakers can adjust their choices with new information and correct for past errors.
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The application of the adaptive learning framework to macroeconomic issues in developing countries and especially Africa has been scarce. We contribute to closing this knowledge gap with a modified model of Buera et al. (2011) , applied to capital account liberalization in developing countries and adjusted to answer the following questions:
Can adaptive learning explain the paths of capital account liberalization in Africa and other developing regions? (ii)
Are African policymakers learning from their (past) experiences with capital account policies, in the same way as policymakers in other regions? And if so, are they Bayesian learners? (iii)
What role have IMF programs played in countries' learning and capital account policies?
III. Stylized Facts

III.1. Policy uncertainty
African policymakers and those in other developing regions face a much greater uncertainty than advanced economies regarding the impact of policies on growth. This is evidenced in the discrepancy between the forecast and actual growth during 1990 -2011 (Table 1) . This uncertainty makes the learning framework adopted in this paper particularly relevant for the region and developing countries in general. Source: Genberg and Martinez (2014) .
III.2 Increased capital account openness
We measure the extent of capital account openness in Africa using the de facto and the de jure indicators. The "de facto" financial openness index is the sum of capital inflows and outflows relative to the GDP, while the "de jure" openness covers regulations. 3 For Africa, these indicators are somewhat correlated; 4 but differences between the intent of policymakers and the actual capital flows are also evident. In particular, the de jure openness is outpacing the de facto one, indicating that countries may have few capital account restrictions but experience only limited capital flows i.e., liberalization without integration. Figure 1 illustrates how the correlation between the capital account openness (de facto and de jure) and financing gap of African countries changes with the measure of openness used. On the one hand, it shows that the de facto capital account openness is negatively correlated to the financing needs of countries 3 As in Chinn and Ito (2008) , this variable is obtained from the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Restrictions. Specifically, it is obtained through the first standardized principal component of the variables that indicate (1) the presence of multiple exchange rates, (2) restrictions on current account transactions, (3) on capital account transactions, (4) and the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. 4 For African countries the correlation is statistically significant at 5% and is equal to 0.413.
( Figure 1a ). This first graph shows that countries with higher financing needs tend to liberalize their economies. On the other hand, a positive relation between the de jure capital account openness and the extent of financing gap in African countries is highlighted in Figure 1b . This puzzling result indicates that there is an important gap between the desire of policymakers for capital openness and the observed level. Source: Authors' calculations based on GDF (2013), WDI (2013) and Aizenman, et al. (2012) . Note: The 'de facto capital account openness is the ratio of FDI and portfolio investment to GDP (in %). Financing gap is in % of GDP is computed as the difference between the saving rate and the investment rate. The index of de jure ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating complete de jure capital account openness.
Taking into account this discrepancy, we consider an economy to be liberalized when both the de facto and the de jure indicators of capital openness show so. The periods of de facto capital account liberalization are constructed by identifying the episodes of major capital inflows (i.e. important changes in the trend of capital inflows). 5 According to this criterion eighteen (18) African economies liberalized their capital accounts as of 2012. Most of them are frontier markets, i.e. countries integrated the most into the global financial system. Hence Africa exhibits overall trend towards capital account liberalization, albeit with delay relative to other regions (Figure 2 ). African countries often started liberalizing their capital accounts by removing restrictions on longer term transactions, especially FDI inflows (Figure 3 ). Controls on all types of capital outflows (equity, direct investment and financial) remain the most common restriction. The speed of liberalization differed across countries. For example, while Mauritius and Zambia fully liberalized their capital accounts at the beginning of the 1990s, Angola, Tunisia and Tanzania kept strong restrictions in place during 1995-2005. 6 Similarly, in 1999 members of the West Africa Monetary Union (WAEMU) eliminated capital controls on inward FDI as well as foreign borrowing by residents and harmonized capital account rules, but still kept controls on capital outflows to non-WAEMU countries (IMF, 2008) . 5 The date of structural break is identified through Andrews-Zivot test and the multiple structural breaks test. The 'de facto' index signals the year when a country has liberalized. To avoid the potential false signals of liberalization, the Andrew-Zivot identification is supplemented by a threshold analysis. Therefore, a country is financially liberalized at year t if total capital inflows has a trend break at or before t and there is at least one year with a capital inflows-to-GDP ratio greater than 5% at or before t (see Rancière et al. 2006) . 
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III.3 Factors impacting capital account liberalization
Several factors can explain the slow progress with capital account liberalization in Africa. Key among them are (i) restrictions due to the Mundell's impossible trinity and (ii) uncertainty about growth benefits of liberalization. Since a large share of African countries had de facto pegged rates during 1980s and 1990s, their room for capital account liberalization was limited. The uncertainty about the growth benefits of opening capital accounts has also likely played a role in limited capital account liberalization. Finally, the acceleration of capital account liberalization during the early 2000s may be related to debt relief and the associated conditions under the IMF programs. 
a. The Mundell's trilemma
The Mundell's trilemma (impossible trinity) posits that a country can achieve only two policy objectives out of financial integration, exchange rate stability and monetary independence (Aizenman, 2011) . 7 In Africa, where a large number of countries belong to regional economic zones, including monetary unions, the domestic policymakers are also constrained by rules and convergence targets of these zones. 8 The evolution of Mundell's trilemma in Africa during 1970 -2010 is depicted in Figures 2 and 4 and 5. 9 Three indexes are used to describe the trilemma, ranging from 0-1. Zero represents absence of monetary independence and a pure float regime. Higher values of exchange rate stability index indicate more stable movement of the exchange rate against the currency of the base country (Aizenman et al., 2012) . Figure 4a . Africa, during 1970 Africa, during -2010 7 The Mundell's trilemma highlights the trade-offs in degree of achieving the three policy objectives. Most countries choose the degree of financial integration and exchange rate flexibility. Aizeman (2011) posits that costs associated with financial crises turned trilemma policy goals into the policy quadrilemma. 8 The convergence criteria of the EAC (East African Community) include targets for international reserves and fiscal deficits. Furthermore, in 2000, the foreign exchange regulations of the central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) members were harmonized and all controls were lift within the CEMAC zone. 9 This sample splitting is based on Andrews-Zivot structural breaks test.. Outside of the WAEMU, CEMAC and CMA countries, which already entered common monetary zones, the goal of monetary independence seems to be the most constraining factor (Annex I, Table 1 ). This can be explained by a relatively high frequency of shocks in Africa that monetary policy can help mitigate. African policymakers also value the exchange rate stability. In contrast, the capital account liberalization was the least important factor in the trilemma configuration of African countries during 1970 -2010. 10 The trilemma policy configuration is obtained by examining the contribution of each policy dimension to the total, by regressing a constant (set 2 in our case) on the three indices as in Aizenman, Chinn and Ito (2012). 
Figure 4. Evolutions of Mundell's Trilemma in Different Regions
. Uncertainty about growth payoffs of capital account liberalization
Capital account liberalization involves trade-offs between higher longer term growth due to improved allocative efficiency and lower growth due to the recessionary impacts of financial crises and the uncertainty that they bring about. Rancière et al. (2006) posit that over the long run, the pro-growth effects of financial deepening outweigh the negative effects of crises. Table 2 shows the patterns of growth categorized by the degree of openness of countries' capital accounts. It suggests that capital controls have not limited Africa's financial fragility. In fact, financial crises have been less frequent in countries with liberalized capital accounts than in those that have kept controls in place. 11 These observations can be explained by several factors. First, as discussed above, many African countries liberalized inflows, but kept some controls on outflows. Still, this could lead to 'sudden stops' with well documented negative consequences (Brixiova, et al., 2010, among others) . Second, FDI inflows, which are relatively stable, have comprised most of the capital flows to Africa, while the more unstable portfolio flows have been sparse. Third, 'stronger capital accounts' and accumulation of international reserves in the run up to the global financial crisis have potentially increased Africa's resilience to external shocks (Elhiraika and Ndikumana, 2007) .
In Africa capital openness is associated with higher longer term growth than capital controls, despite increased cost of financial crises (Table 3) . While financial crises seem to be less frequent after capital account opening, those that do occur tend to be severe and more costly in terms of loss of the real GDP per capita growth than crises before liberalization. 
c. Capital account policies and the IMF programs
The IMF established the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) in 1986 and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in 1987, both for low income countries. In 1999, the ESAF was replaced by the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). 12 The other two common programs were (i) Standby Arrangement (SBA) and (ii) Extended fund facility (EFF). Table 4 displays the number of years during which countries have been under IMF program in percentage of the total number of observations. IMF programs are not systematically associated with capital account liberalization (Joyce and Noy, 2008) . a linear probability model linking capital account openness and IMF programs. This model controls for individual effects. SBA5 is a dummy variable for IMF Stand-byArrangement in effect for at least 5 months in a particular year. PRGF5 is a dummy variable for IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Arrangement in effect for at least 5 months in a particular year. EFF5 is a dummy variable for IMF Extended Fund Facility Arrangement in effect for at least 5 months in a particular year.
Further analysis of specific IMF programs shows that while PRGF programs had a positive impact on capital account liberalization in all regions, the impact was the smallest in Africa. SBA and EFF programs had a negative (and statistically significant) impact on capital account openness in Africa (Table 5) . These results are particularly interesting in the learning framework, because they suggest that there is an uncertainty about the relation between IMF programs adoption and capital account liberalization.
IV. The Model
This section presents a model in which policymakers update their beliefs about growth impact of capital account policies. The beliefs are also impacted by the adoption of IMF programs. These beliefs then in turn impact policymakers' choices of capital account policies.
IV.1 Set up
The choice of capital account policies is divided into a binary decision to either liberalize capital account or impose controls. Policies are chosen every period, with the objective to maximize the expected level of per capita GDP. Policymakers, who are in power for one period, choose it  so as to solve: . The maximization is subject to (i) policymakers' perceived relationship between capital account policy choices and GDP growth and (ii) the constraint imposed by the Mundell's trilemma. Policymakers solve the problem given equation (1) as if these beliefs will not change in the future.
The policymakers' perceptions about relationship between policy choices and GDP growth are derived from payoffs associated with each policy option. Specifically:
Capital liberalization option, with payoffs:
Capital control option, with payoffs: From these payoffs, policymakers form the following perception about the dynamics of GDP per capita growth:
Equation (2) implies that policymakers perceive capital account policies to be a linear function of the real GDP per capita growth. it  denotes errors in the policymakers' perceptions or the unexplained part of growth. The errors arise because capital account policies are not the only sources of growth and the policymakers do not know the exact effects of each capital account policy. In choosing policies, the policymaker considers also the relative cost (in terms of growth) of capital openness relative to capital controls.
The costs associated with capital account liberalization, it Z , can be described as:
with a deterministic part, In our framework, agents treat the parameters of their model as constant when they form decision rules, but update them according to actual observations. Thus, the timing of events is as follows: at the end of time t-1, policymakers in country i observe the past policy choices and the associated GDP growth rates, and update their beliefs about
IV.2. Equilibrium
Policymakers arrive at an equilibrium decision rule for capital account policies by solving (4). They choose to pursue capital account liberalization policies (i.e.
 it

) if the expected gain in growth rates associated with this policy exceeds the cost.
14 That is, 14 The proof of the existence of this equilibrium is straightforward and available upon request from the authors. It is based upon the policy decision following a cutoff rule which is continuous and strictly monotonic in
The equilibrium policy rule is defined as the optimal time allocated to capital account liberalization (or to capital control).
15 In equilibrium, policymakers' expectations must be consistent with actual probability of liberalizing:
where E is an expectation operator, 1  t D is policy decision taken at t-1 ,  is a normal distribution function, and
the expected gain from capital account liberalization. 16 The probability that capital account liberalization policies will be adopted is high when policymakers are optimistic about the growth effect of these policies, that is when
The growth benefits of capital account liberalization are adjusted for the shadow cost associated with complying with the Mundell trilemma (i.e., , the Lagrange multiplier). Specifically, 
IV.3 Learning
In this model, we posit that for behavior of policymakers, especially in developing countries, rational expectations are a too strong assumption. The rational expectations (RE) framework assumes that policymakers´ beliefs coincide with the probabilities predicted by the model. However, policymakers make errors, either about workings of the economy or its parameters. Their expectations about the impact of policies on outcomes change over time. Likelihood of errors is even higher in Africa given the frequent shocks impacting the continent.
More specifically, we assume that policymakers do not know the exact effects of capital account liberalization on growth.
17 Instead, they form expectations about the effect of each capital account policy option. Their perceptions are described by a linear relation between real GDP per capita growth and capital control, as in Equation (1) 15 Assuming that the measure of countries is normalized to one, the share of countries dedicated to the policy option 1  it  at time t, it  , can be expressed as the probability that
16 This decision framework is similar to the rule derived in Buera et al., (2011) and Bicaba and Coricelli (2014) . 17 Assuming uncertainty about the gains of capital account liberalization is plausible since robust support for large quantifiable benefits or costs of international financial integration has been missing (Rey, 2013 The timing of the model is such that policymakers form their beliefs about the effects of liberalization (or no liberalization) at t-1. The decision to liberalize or not is taken based on these beliefs. These beliefs are updated at t with new information. Policymakers will switch to the alternative policy option in the presence of a large negative shock to growth.
V. Results
This section presents the results. Estimations are carried out with panel data. Given the limited data availability, an unbalanced panel is used. Second, the mechanism of updating of policymakers beliefs is country-specific, accounting for the differences in business cycles.
V.1 Parameterization --Policymakers' initial beliefs
To derive the initial beliefs of policymakers about the impact of capital account policies on growth, we consider a sample of 45 African countries during 1980-2010. Since the information on de jure capital account liberalization (i.e. regulations and policies) is limited to 2006, the 'de jure' measure is supplemented by the 'de facto' one for 2007 -2010. This allows us to include the period of the global financial crisis. We also compare Africa's experience with those of Latin America (19 countries) and developing Asia (18 countries).
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Observed data is critical for decision making under uncertainty. We construct the initial policymakers' priors using the period 1960-1980 (Table 6) 
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In 1980, African policymakers viewed capital controls as optimal, since countries with capital controls posted higher growth that those that liberalized, i.e. 
V.2 Cost of capital account policies
In this section, we analyze determinants of cost of capital account liberalization, namely the level of development (GDP per capita), the degree of financial development, the occurrence of currency crises, and the stock of international reserves. We also take into account exchange rate stability and monetary independence based on the Mundell's trilemma.
In summary, while the priors of African policymakers were largely in favor of capital controls, policymakers in developing Asia, and to a lesser extent in Latin America, leaned more in favor of capital account liberalization. The uncertainty about these priors (measured by variance) was higher in African countries than in the other regions.
In this model, the costs are expressed in relative terms, that is as a proportion of GDP per capita growth.
The parameters (  ) of the cost function (  ) are obtained through the updating mechanism, a nonlinear probabilistic model is estimated. In addition, we control for countries fixed effects in order to account for cross country differences in capital account liberalization. Table 7 shows the posterior estimates of the cost parameters. We find that economic development (measured by GDP per capita) is one of the key determinants of cost of capital account liberalization. As countries develop, their institutions improve, implying that they will be able to open capital accounts without incurring high costs. 20 The literature on the timing of capital account liberalization emphasizes that a developed banking system, effective prudential regulations, and sound institutions are prerequisites for countries to benefit from large capital flows (McKinnon 1993). The second determinant is the financial development captured by the ratio of credit to domestic private sector over GDP. The results suggest that in African countries with a developed domestic financial system and financial markets' friendly policies are on average associated with a lower cost of liberalization. In contrast, when policymakers adopt capital account liberalization in a context of underdeveloped domestic financial system, they expose their economy to costly financial crises, as in Calvo and Mendoza (2000) . The study by Aoki et al. (2010) shows the adjustment to liberalization of international financial transaction depends upon the degree of domestic financial development. For poor countries with weak policies and institutions, a key lesson is that capital account liberalization works well if implemented with other sound policies (Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 2003) In Africa, the Mundell trilemma configuration differs from the configuration in other regions. In developing Asia, for example, a high degree of monetary independence increases the cost of liberalizing capital account. As a result, Asia's policymakers are less likely to liberalize their capital accounts. Further, by increasing the stock of international reserves by 1% of GDP, African policymakers can reduce the potential growth cost of capital account liberalization. In other words, when the stock of reserves accumulated is high, policymakers perceive capital account liberalization as more beneficial in terms of growth.
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V.3 Model's fit
This section brings the model to data in order to determine whether learning has been an important factor in the dynamics of capital account policies in Africa and in other developing regions. The situation has been different in developing Asia. Indeed, as in Africa, the model shows good overall and real time predictive quality. Still, in real time, the model performs better in explaining the policy changes, since 62 percent of changes in policies are well predicted at t (without a delay). Finally, for Latin American countries, even if the overall predictive quality of the model is good, the adaptive learning framework does not perform well in explaining the observed changes in policies. In fact, only 6 percent of capital account policy changes that occurred at time t are well predicted, without any delay, by the model.
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V.4 Learning and evolution of beliefs
The expectations formed by the domestic policymakers and their evolution are a key factor in capital account management. We thus explore how these expectations change over time and how adaptive learning affects their dynamics. The difference between the perceived growth under capital account liberalization and under capital account controls ( We also analyze the accuracy of African policymakers' expectations about the growth effects of each policy option, through evolution of the variance of The explanation for the good empirical fit of our model is twofold. First, the initial low share of countries with capital account openness reflects the information contained in the actual data until 1980, from which the initial parameters were obtained. The reluctance of the Africa countries to liberalize during the 1980s reflects the superior growth performance of countries with closed capital accounts (Table 5) . Second, the adaptive learning also sheds light on the accelerated liberalization from the mid-1990s on reflecting improved performance of liberalized economies (Figure 7a ).
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VI. The Impact of IMF Programs
In the presence of IMF programs the learning changes. First, the IMF programs can modify the policymakers' perceptions about the net growth gains from capital account liberalization. Indeed, since IMF programs are often adopted when the economies are facing challenges, their adoption is motivated by the need for improvement. Second, IMF programs can directly decrease (or increase) the cost of capital account liberalization, as they are accompanied by conditionality (in terms of macroeconomic targets or structural benchmarks).
Defining a variable ( it  ) which captures the adoption (or not) of an IMF program , such that
The policymakers have the following options: (i) either they adopt liberalization with the IMF program, or (ii) liberalization without IMF program, or (iii) capital control with the IMF program (iv) or capital controls without IMF program (Table 9 ). 
The policymakers' perceptions evolve as follows:
 is belief about the effects of capital account liberalization in the presence of an IMF program and
 is policymaker's belief under the alternative policy option.
In Table 10 , we recalculated the priors of policymakers about the growth effects of capital account policies in 1990. Under the IMF programs, African policymakers initially perceived capital account liberalization as damaging to growth. The worst initial beliefs are observed for the policy option The main finding is that IMF programs have modified policymakers' beliefs about the benefit of capital account liberalization. Figures (8a) and (8b) depict the evolution of beliefs for countries under IMF programs (8a) and for countries without programs (8b). First, there is a constant improvement in beliefs in favor of capital account liberalization. Even if they started with a weak economic situation, countries which adopted IMF programs and capital account liberalization have improved their perceptions. Second, the adoption of liberalization is faster with IMF programs, this could be due to perception, conditionalities or to both. 
Note: the priors are computed over the period . Finally, the learning model predicts more accurately capital account policy switches in countries with an IMF program than in countries without one. Indeed, the model successfully predicts 16 percent of policy switches contemporaneously and 41 percent of policy switches at t+1. In contrast, in countries without an IMF program, the model predicts only 5 percent of switches at time t and 15 percent at time t+1. In other words, policymakers learn more when there is an IMF program in place (Table 11) . 
VII. Conclusions
This paper explored interactions between growth and capital account policies in developing regions during 1980 -2010, utilizing an innovative adaptive learning framework. In this framework, policymakers choose capital account policies to maximize real GDP growth per capita, taking into uncertainty about the net growth payoffs. Their choices are constrained by the 'Mundell's trilemma', that is the ability to reach only two policy goals among financial liberalization, fixed exchange rate and monetary autonomy. Policymakers update their beliefs about the impact of capital account policies on growth based on information obtained from actual growth outcomes and through IMF programs. The model was then simulated with parameters calibrated to data in Africa, Latin America and developing Asia during 1960 -1980 . After that, the parameters were updated for actual outcomes every year.
The adaptive learning approach can help explain Africa's path of capital account liberalization, including its delay with other regions.
23 According to the model, African policymakers' understanding of impacts of capital account policies on growth has increased over time, leading to better informed policy choices. Still, over the studied period, Africa's capital account policies were changing more frequently than those of other regions, creating policy uncertainty for economic agents. This underscores the importance of building stronger policymaking institutions and rules in the region to mitigate this high volatility. Finally, one of the implications of the model is that even countries' with liberalized account could revert to increased use of capital controls in the presence of particularly large output shocks.
Future research could utilize the adaptive learning framework developed in this paper for examining other policy issues related to capital flows and their volatility. The example includes the interactions of capital controls with other instruments impacting capital flows, such as macro-prudential regulations, foreign exchange interventions and/or setting of the policy rate, and their impact on growth. Tables 1a and 1b report the average contribution of each policy (i.e. share of the overall policy space taken by each objective) when the Mundell's trilemma is binding and policy choices involve trade-offs. While not part of the trilemma, international reserves have increasingly become a key macro-economic target in developing countries. Some researchers posit that the high priority assigned to international reserves was motivated by achieving stable exchange rates even under sudden and sizeable capital outflows (Aizenman, 2011) . Even though African countries accumulated some international reserves during 2000s and used them as a buffer during the global financial crisis (Figure 3a) , the international reserves received a low policy priority in Africa (Table 1b) . 24 Instead, the policy mix of monetary independence and exchange rate stability was the most prevalent during our study period. The second determinant is the quality of political institutions, the a key factor behind the speed of adjustment in developing Asia. In Africa, policymakers in countries with more democratic institutions seem to exhibit more flexibility in their policies. Another constraint to decisions is the degree of fractionalization of the domestic political system. 27 We expect the competition among various policies to be higher and hence adjustment more frequent in fractionalized political systems (Table 1 AIII) .
Annex I -Mundell's Trilemma
